More Fun Wrinkles of the Is-Ought Problem

About a year ago I wrote this post clarifying some of my thoughts on the pervasiveness of the is-ought problem in modern discourse.  Specifically, I showed that part of the reason for the relevance of that framework is that neither category represents a strict binary orientation towards one's rhetorical aims, which allows one to consider the "is-ness" and "ought-ness" of any particular claim.  Most of the piece discusses how the "is" half of the equation is routinely abused to advance what are fundamentally conservative arguments, and I conclude by addressing the other half as well:

"After all, saying what ought to happen is not merely a rhetorical device; rather, it's the first step in potentially making that thing happen.  If you instead decide to alchemize your fear into a categorical imperative that effectively forbids any demands of those in power then you have implicitly, if not explicitly, accepted defeat."

By addressing this problem dialectically, I allow for one to, in good faith, apply multiple interpretations of any seemingly pragmatic argument against progressive change.  Is such an approach overly generous towards some pundits we know to be undeserving of this good faith?  Yes!  But is it also useful to consider some of their arguments through this framework, so as to better understand our own positions and arguments?  Also yes!  Why don't we do this together!

Friend of the blog Eric Levitz provides a helpful demonstration of how one can over-index the "ought-ness" of an argument.  Buried in that chain of screenshots is the metrics for Ken's post where he published the "manifesto" in question.  Ken is clearly arguing that the incredibly high demand for this information indicates a meaningful public interest for that item.  It does not necessarily claim that either a) any popular post indicates a legitimate public interest, or b) there are not other considerations for what might constitute the public interest.  Indeed, Ken's refusal to publish the fake manifesto is an implicit demonstration that he likely does not believe either of these claims.  And yet, Levitz appears to assume that Ken's specific claim that releasing the manifesto is in the public interest is actually a far more universal claim.  

Other friend of the blog Yair Rosenberg commits a very similar error to Levitz here, assuming that some level of tacit endorsement of a specific act of violence is equivalent to a categorical approval of all vigilante justice and/or all violence, period.  This paternalistic exaggeration of the "ought-ness" of the situation is easily countered by repeated demonstrations of this exact type of concern in similar situations.  Furthermore, Rosenberg appears to make a faulty assumption about the "is-ness" of political violence in our society.  Indeed, if he were to "crack open a history book" on the subject of American healthcare, he might find that the capital class purposely imposes violence on the masses in search of increased profits.  Perhaps it is this shallow understanding of reality that leads him to misunderstand the normative values of others who do not share his ignorance.

In short, the framing of the is-ought problem suggests a rigid dichotomy, but category errors within either side of the problem can support and reinforce incomplete understandings of not just others' positions, but of reality itself.